odespinner

I have been reading about consciousness and the opposing arguments of David Chalmers and Daniel Bennett. Chalmers put forward the thought experiment that  we could conceive of a zombie that was a complete replica of all our physical features and shared our behavioural traits but lacked our conscious experiences. For Chalmers this was proof that consciousness was something extra to physical properties.

Daniel Bennett asks us to conceive of zombies that evolved with advanced intelligence and a consciousness the same as our own. These advanced zombies or ‘zimboes’ are identical to us in every detail and yet they have nothing in addition to their physical properties.

Consciousness is to the brain as health is to the body. We do not ascribe special properties to health, but see good health as the result of maintaining the human body. Consciousness is an aspect of brain function that has evolved in humans but not as a separate phenomena. According to Dennett the zombie argument devised by Chalmers when corrected to allow for zimboes which more accurately replicate ourselves disproves the notion that there is something in addition to our physical properties that constitutes consciousness.